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Abstract 
Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe 
or side-effect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven 
adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well 
as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect 
effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) 
where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional.  Three follow-up 
experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be 
linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of 
factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition.  
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1. Introduction 
The ability to distinguish between intentional and non-intentional action is an essential 
component of social cognition (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). In general, intentional harms 
are judged more harshly than unintentional harms (Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Sheketoff, 
Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Intention-based moral 
evaluations and third party preferences are early developmental facts, observable in babies 
younger than 12 months (Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & 
Pawson, 2009). Some researchers have argued that the relation between attributions of 
intentional action and moral evaluations, either positive or negative, is an innate principle of our 
moral psychology, part of a “universal moral grammar” (Mikhail, 2007). As a case in point, in 
U.S. criminal law and the codes of most other cultures, intentional harms tend to be judged more 
severely than non-intentional harms (Fletcher, 1998; Green, 2000). In the U.S., manslaughter is 
associated with lesser penalties (10-16 months in prison), whereas the federal sentence for 
murder ranges from 19.5 years in prison to a mandatory life sentence (Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual §2A1.1-§2A1.4). The punishment is different, even though the absolute 
outcome of the crime is the same. Likewise, the severity of our moral judgments depends in 
general on our ascription of relative intention behind the offense.  
Recent research in psychology and philosophy draws a complex picture of the relation 
between attribution of intentional action and moral evaluation. For example, numerous findings 
report that people are much more likely to judge that bad outcomes are brought about 
intentionally compared to good outcomes, the so-called side-effect effect or Knobe effect 
(original research by Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006, 2010; Knobe & Mendlow, 2004; see 
additional studies by Cova & Naar, 2012; Cushman & Mele, 2008; Ditto, Pizarro, & 
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Tannenbaum, 2009; Lanteri, 2012; Nadelhoffer, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006; Pellizzoni, Girotto, 
& Surian, 2010; Sousa & Holbrook, 2010; Wright & Bengson, 2009). The side-effect effect has 
been claimed to reflect deep and fundamental facts about human cognition. However, these 
claims often occur in the absence of considerations of culture and context. Our approach here is 
cross-cultural. The general rationale guiding our study is that if these effects are truly intrinsic 
and pervasive facts about our moral psychology, they are likely to be universal and should hold 
outside the predominantly W.E.I.R.D. (White Educated Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) 
populations tested to date (Henrich, Heine, & Norensayan, 2010). The question is whether these 
phenomena might hold across a wide range of cultures, as implied by many moral theorists 
studying the side-effect effect and allied phenomena.  
In the original Knobe (2003a) study, participants were presented with one of two 
scenarios. Both scenarios involved a decision made by the chairman of a board of a company to 
increase company profits. The only thing that differed between the two scenarios was the 
goodness or badness of a foreseen side effect of the chairman’s decision, specifically whether the 
environment was helped or harmed as a result of the decision. After reading the scenario, 
participants were asked whether the chairman intentionally harmed (or helped) the environment 
and whether the chairman deserved blame (or praise) for harming (or helping) the environment. 
Knobe’s results were striking: Eighty-two percent of participants said that the chairman 
intentionally harmed the environment, while only 23 percent said the chairman intentionally 
helped the environment. In response to the blame/praise question, participants strongly agreed 
that the chairman deserved blame for harming the environment, but that the chairman did not 
deserve praise for helping the environment.  The author also found a strong, positive correlation 
between attributions of intentional action and judgments of blame/praise.  
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The tendency to attribute intentions to negative but not positive outcomes (the side-effect 
effect) has been observed across a wide variety of methodologies. This asymmetry in intentional 
action attributions has been replicated with other scenarios (Knobe, 2003b; Knobe & Mendlow, 
2004; Mallon, 2008; Nadelhoffer 2004a, 2006; Shepard & Wolff, 2013; Uttich & Lombrozo, 
2010; Wright & Bengson, 2008), with children as young as four years (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 
2006), with participants who suffer from deficits in emotional processing due to lesions in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Young, Cushman, Adolphs, & Hauser, 2006), and, for at least 
some versions of the scenarios, with adults with high functioning autism or Asperger’s (Zalla & 
Leboyer, 2011; Zalla, Machery, & Leboyer, 2010). The asymmetry has also been reported with 
word changes in the original script introducing varying concepts such as intention and intending 
(McCann, 2005), deciding, being in favor of, advocating for (Pettit & Knobe, 2009), knowledge 
(Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010), belief (Beebe, 2013; Tannenbaum, Ditto, & Pizarro, 2007), 
awareness (Tannenbaum, et al., 2007) remembering (Alfano, et al., 2012), and desire 
(Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Tannenbaum, et al., 2007).  
In general, these findings have been interpreted to suggest that our concept of intentional 
action, along with other theory of mind concepts, is fundamentally moral or morally driven 
(Knobe, 2005) and that this role is deep and pervasive (Knobe, 2005, 2006, 2010). Further 
support for such moral underpinnings comes from the fact that there is a pervasive asymmetry in 
the ratings of blame and praise (Knobe, 2003a).  
In all, the question is whether such asymmetries do actually tell us anything fundamental 
about the way we think about moral evaluations, intentional action, and their relation. In other 
words, we ask whether the side-effect effect is truly universal or might vary across cultures. To 
our knowledge, a limited number of cross-cultural comparisons have yielded contrary findings. 
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Knobe & Burra (2006) replicated the side-effect effect in a sample of 61 US college Hindi-
speaking students in South Asian clubs at Princeton University and Yale University using a 
Hindi translation of the original script, but a more recent comparison of US participants and 
Indian participants tested in either Hindi or English suggests a reversed side-effect effect, 
whereby Indian participants judged helpful acts as more intentional than harmful ones (Clark et 
al., 2017). The explicit claims, and often implicit assumptions, of the side-effect effect as being 
intrinsic to human cognition require further scrutiny. To further address the question of how 
universal these effects are, we assessed them across eleven cohorts of adults amongst eight 
highly contrasted cultures (Study 1). In a series of follow-up experiments, we demonstrate that 
inversions of the side-effect effect may be linked to perceptions of status (Studies 2-4).  
 
2. General method 
A convenience sample of 464 participants (253 female) between the ages of 14-90 
(M=31.39, SD=13.40 years) completed the study.  Table 1 summarizes the demographic 
information for each of the eleven cohorts and their corresponding eight different cultures. 
Participants were recruited and tested individually in public spaces (e.g., public park, company 
break room) by experimenters who were residents of the area and fluent in the local language, or 
who were non-natives assisted by local informants fluent in both English and the local language.  
In all cultures, the vignettes and follow-up questions (described in detail below and reproduced 
in the Supplemental Materials) were translated and back-translated by independent research 
assistants who were native speakers of the local language and also fluent in English. The 
translated vignettes were then presented to participants in written format and read aloud by the 
experimenter or her assistant.  At test, participants indicated their responses to the experimenter, 
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who recorded them on a coding sheet. Participants who could not answer prompts probing for 
story comprehension were excluded from analysis, yielding an attrition rate of 2% collapsed 
across all cultures. 
Table 1: Demographic highlights of the eleven cohorts across eight cultures. 
Country Region Setting Environment SES status  Population 
 Highlights 
Design  
USA 1 
(N= 60) 
New York 
City 
Public 
Space 
Urban Middle/High Mixed ethnicity 
and income; 
Age=18-78 years, 
M=38.91, 
SD=14.28 years, 
30 females 
Between 
Subjects 
(Harm 
Condition:  
N = 30, Help 
Condition:  
N = 30) 
USA 2 
(N=25) 
Metro-
Atlanta 
University Urban Middle/ 
High 
Predominantly 
Caucasian 
undergraduate 
students; Age=19-
25 years, M=20.71, 
SD=1.52 years, 13 
females 
Between 
Subjects 
(Harm 
Condition:  
N = 12, Help 
Condition:  
N = 13) 
USA 3 
(N=56) 
 
 
Metro-
Atlanta 
University Urban Middle/High Predominantly 
Caucasian 
undergraduate 
students; Age=18- 
50 years, M= 
20.20, SD =5.21,  
30 females 
Within 
Subjects (all 
participants 
completed 
both help and 
harm 
conditions) 
USA 4  
(N=60) 
Metro-
Atlanta 
University Urban Middle/High Predominantly 
Caucasian 
undergraduate 
students; Age = 
18-65 years, M = 
24.77, SD = 10.28, 
35 females 
Within 
subjects (all 
participants 
completed 
both help and 
harm 
conditions) 
SAMOA  
(N = 73)  
Faga, 
Savai’i, 
Polynesia 
Village Rural, chief 
system, 
traditional, 
collectivistic 
and highly 
hierarchical 
(matai) system. 
Very Low Adults of a 
subsistence living 
village with a 
population of 
approximately 500; 
Age=14-65 years, 
M=30.48, 
SD=13.46 years, 
38 females 
Within-
Subjects (all 
participants 
completed 
both help and 
harm 
conditions) 
VANUATU  
(N = 67) 
Motalava, 
Banks 
Island, 
Melanesia 
Village Rural, chief 
system, 
traditional, 
collectivistic 
and egalitarian  
Very Low Adults of a highly 
insular and isolated 
subsistence living 
village with a 
population of 
approximately 
1000; Age=17-90 
Within-
Subjects (all 
participants 
completed 
both help and 
harm 
conditions) 
 10 
years, M=32.56, 
SD=15.43 years, 
42 females 
COSTA 
RICA (N=21) 
Talamanca  Village Rural, chief 
system, 
traditional, 
matrilineal, 
collectivistic 
Very Low Adults of a 
traditional BriBri 
village depending 
heavily on external 
aide with a 
population of 
approximately 300; 
Age=15-70 years, 
M=40.00, 
SD=15.28, 10 
females 
Between-
Subjects 
(Harm 
Condition:  
N = 9, Help 
Condition:  
N = 12) 
MEXICO 1 
(N=16) 
Chiapas Custapec  Rural Low Chiapas-born 
Mexican 
employees 
working and living 
on an isolated 
coffee plantation; 
Age=15-55 years, 
M=36.31, 
SD=12.61,  
6 females 
Within-
subjects (all 
participants 
completed 
both help and 
harm 
conditions) 
MEXICO 2 
(N=17) 
Chiapas Custapec Rural Low/ 
Very Low 
Guatemalan 
migrant workers 
seasonally 
employed and 
temporarily living 
on an isolated 
coffee plantation; 
Age=15-55 years, 
M=25.00, 
SD=11.60,  
7 females 
Within-
subjects (all 
participants 
completed 
both help and 
harm 
conditions)) 
SOUTH 
KOREA  
(N= 34) 
Seoul Public 
Space 
Urban  Middle/High Adults of mixed 
income; Age=21-
61 years, M=36.21, 
SD=10.79 years, 
21 females 
Between-
subjects 
(Harm 
condition:  
N = 18, Help 
Condition:  
N = 16) 
HONDURAS  
(N=35) 
San Pedro 
Sula 
Workplace Urban Middle/High Adults of a 
Korean-owned 
company working 
in Honduras; 
Age=21-57 years; 
M=34.43, 
SD=8.46, 21 
females 
Between-
subjects 
(Harm-
condition:  
N = 18, Help 
Condition:  
N = 17) 
Note: Experiment 1 included all populations but the USA 3 and USA 4 cohorts; only a subset of 
participants in Samoa (N=27) and Vanuatu (N=34) additionally completed Experiment 2. 
Experiment 4 included only participants from the USA 4 cohort. 
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In two conditions (harm versus help), we assessed whether judgments of intentional 
action, as well as ratings of either blame or praise, depended on the framing of a story in which a 
protagonist makes a decision about an agricultural policy that will increase community profits, 
but with consequences for the local environment and crops. This protagonist (either a CEO or 
village High Chief depending on culture) represents an individual recognized as having decision-
making power and social ascendance. They represent a supreme authority in economic decisions.  
In this sense, the responsibilities of CEO and Chief overlap. In the vignettes, a subordinate 
approaches the protagonist with a suggestion about how to increase profits.  In the “harm” 
condition, this suggestion will increase profits but also damage the environment. In the “help” 
condition, this suggestion will increase profits and also improve the environment.  In both 
conditions, the protagonist responds by saying that his only concern is maximizing profit, and 
that he does not care at all about the effect on the environment. The suggestion is adopted, and 
the vignette ends with the environment being either harmed or helped. Crucially, the vignettes 
differ only in the effect (help or harm) that the suggestion will have on the environment (see 
Supplemental Materials). Note that the well-being of the local environment was a moral concern 
for all cultures, and particularly so for our subsistence-based populations (see O’Meara, 1990, 
Shore, 1982, and Vienne, 1984 regarding the South Pacific but also Cusack & Dixon, 2006, 
Dahlquist et al., 2007, and Polidoro et al., 2008 regarding environmental practice in Central 
America). 
  Following the story, participants answered two questions. The first question asked 
participants to determine how much praise (help condition) or blame (harm condition) the 
protagonist deserves on a seven-point Likert scale, with zero indicating none and six indicating a 
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lot. Across culture and conditions, participants tended to make full use of the scale. The second 
question asked participants whether they thought the leader intentionally helped or harmed the 
environment (coded as yes or no). Although other versions of the paradigm have used continuous 
measures for this judgment of intentional action, we elected to use a dichotomous outcome 
because intentional action is typically construed as binary (i.e., either someone acted 
intentionally or they did not) and in order to keep the question simple by avoiding an agree-
disagree scale. 
 
 
3. Experiment 1 
3.1 Method 
In Experiment 1 (N= 348 participants), the decisions described in the vignette were 
enacted by a protagonist described as either the CEO of an organization (USA 1, USA 2, Mexico 
1, Mexico 2, South Korea, and Honduras) or alternately as the High Chief of a village (Samoa, 
Vanuatu, and Costa Rica) to reflect local leadership conventions (see Supplemental Materials). 
Half of the participants (N=175 from five populations: USA 1, USA 2, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
South Korea) received only one condition (i.e., either help or harm). The other half of 
participants (N=173 from four populations: Mexico 1, Mexico 2, Samoa, and Vanuatu) were 
tested successively in both conditions (help and harm) in a counterbalanced order. This within-
subject manipulation opportunistically allowed us to assess whether potential asymmetries 
between judgments of intentional action and praise/blame ratings noted at a group level might 
also hold within individuals.  
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3.2 Results 
In an initial analysis, and in order to compare the nine populations directly, we 
considered only responses to the first vignette read by the participant (harm or help). We first 
compared the proportion of participants who judged the protagonist’s action as intentional. 
Results indicate a significant joint influence of culture and condition (help or harm) on 
judgments of intentionality (χ2 = 14.37, df = 1, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .167).  In follow-up tests, 
the majority of cultures demonstrated either a significant (USA 1, USA 2, Mexico 1, South 
Korea; all p < .01 based on Fisher’s exact tests) or marginal tendency (Costa Rica, Mexico 2, 
Honduras) to ascribe intentionality to the protagonist in the harm but not the help condition 
(Figure 1). This asymmetry was inverted significantly in Samoa (p < .01) and to a lesser extent in 
Vanuatu (p=.096) where participants tended to judge the protagonist’s actions as intentional in 
the help but not the harm condition. These results indicate that the original Knobe report of an 
asymmetry in judgments of intentionality between harm versus help conditions does not hold in 
our South Pacific samples where attributions of intentional action are more common in the help 
condition. 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of participants in each culture who judge the action to be intentional in the 
harm and help conditions.  Asterisks denote significant differences between conditions based on 
Fisher’s exact tests; *** p < .001, ** p < .01. 
 
 
Regarding the Likert scale ratings of praise or blame, a univariate ANOVA factoring 
condition (2) and culture (9) as between-subjects factors yielded a significant interaction of 
condition and culture (F(7,269) = 8.573, p < .01, K2 = .182).  Participants in USA 1, USA 2, 
Costa Rica, Mexico 1, and South Korea gave significantly greater ratings of blame than praise 
(all p < .05 based on two-tail pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni-adjustments). In contrast, 
participants in all other cultures showed either no difference between these two conditions 
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(Mexico 2 and Honduras), or demonstrated a slightly inverted trend toward higher 
praiseworthiness (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.  Mean ratings for blame (in the harm condition) and praise (in the help condition) as a 
function of culture.  Asterisks denote significant pairwise comparisons between conditions (two-
tailed with Bonferroni corrections), ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.  Bars represent +/- 1 SEM. 
 
We also analyzed the association between intentional action and blame/praise ratings, 
following the observation in the original Knobe study (2003) these variables were strongly 
positively correlated. A Spearman correlation yielded a significant relationship between 
judgments of intentional action and praise ratings (rs= .520, N = 178, p< .001). The same positive 
association held for judgments of intentional action and blameworthiness ratings (rs= .325, N = 
166; p<. 001). Table 2 below reports the results of this analysis for each population. As seen in 
the table, the strength of the association is not equal across populations. For some populations, an 
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association exists only between intentional action and blame (USA 1, USA 2, Mexico 1, Mexico 
2, Honduras, and South Korea; all p < .05), as for others no association exists at all (Costa Rica). 
Finally, in the two South Pacific populations, an association exists only between judgments of 
intentional action and praise ratings (both p < .001).  
 
Table 2. Correlations between judgments of intentional action and ratings of blameworthiness 
(harm condition) and praiseworthiness (help condition) as a function of population. 
  
 POPULATION  HARM  HELP  OVERALL 
 
 USA 1    .658***  .343  .681*** 
 
 USA 2    .463*   .248  .443* 
 
 COSTA RICA  .172   .367  .308 
 
 MEXICO 1   ----a   ----b  .907*** 
 
 MEXICO 2   ----a   .477  .296 
 
 KOREA   .629***  .338  .643*** 
 
 HONDURAS   .515*   .388  .571*** 
 
 SAMOA   .252   .325*** .310** 
 
 VANUATU   .260   .529*** .412*** 
 
 TOTAL   .325***  .520*** .488*** 
 
Note: All coefficients represent Spearman correlations between the intentional action and rating 
variables. aValues represent a constant; all participants judged the protagonist as intentionally 
harming the environment. bValues represent a constant; all participants judged that the 
protagonist did not intentionally help the environment.  *** p < .001; ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
 
These results partially confirm the original side-effect effect reported in the Knobe 
(2003a) study that was conducted with only U.S. participants. In our data, a sample of 
participants in Mexico 2 demonstrated no contrast between ratings of praise or blame, and 
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participants in Samoa and Vanuatu even trended toward an inversion of the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the correlation between intentional action and praise/blame ratings is markedly 
different across cultures. 
 In a subsequent analysis we examined the relative consistency of individual responses for 
the subset of participants (N= 173) in Mexico 1, Mexico 2, Samoa, and Vanuatu who 
opportunistically received both help and harm vignettes.  We first examined whether or not 
participants demonstrated the side-effect effect by changing their judgment of intentional action 
between help and harm conditions. Results yielded a significant effect of culture (χ2 = 24.57, df = 
3, p < .001, Crammer’s V = .380).  A significant majority of participants in Mexico 1 (100%) 
and Mexico 2 (82.4%) changed their attributions of intentional action between the two conditions 
(both p < .01), whereas only half of Samoan (50.7%) and Ni-Vanuatu (42.4%) participants did 
the same.  Examining only the participants who changed their responses, we next compared the 
proportion of participants who showed the asymmetry reported by Knobe (2003a) by judging 
actions as intentional in the harm but not the help condition.  We observed a significant effect of 
population (χ2 = 18.75, df = 3, p < .001, Crammer’s V = .487).  When they changed their 
responses, a significant majority of participants in Mexico 1 (100%) and Mexico 2 (92.9%) 
judged that the protagonist intentionally hurt the environment in the harm condition and did not 
intentionally improve the environment in the help condition (both p < .01 based on two-tailed 
binomial tests). Only a small minority of the Samoans (27%) and Ni-Vanuatu (35.7%) 
participants showed this same tendency.  In these two cultures, the significant majority of 
participants (respectively 72.6% and 64.3%) judged that the protagonist did not intentionally 
harm the environment in the harm condition, but that he did intentionally help the environment in 
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the help condition (both p<.01 based on two-tailed binomial tests).  Note that no order effects 
were found for judgments of intentional action in any culture.   
 We also analyzed individual consistency with regard to the ratings of praise and blame.  
A mixed-design ANOVA factoring condition (2), population (4), and condition order (2) yielded 
a significant interaction of condition and population (F(3, 162) = 23.98, p = .001, K2 = .308).  
There was no order effect on praise and blame ratings.  In follow-up tests of this the interaction, 
we found that participants in Mexico 1 and Mexico 2 gave significantly higher ratings in the 
harm condition (both p <.001), whereas participants in Samoa and Vanuatu once again showed 
an inverted tendency to provide significantly higher ratings in the help condition (both p < .05).  
In short, participants in Mexico 1 and 2 gave significantly greater ratings of blameworthiness 
compared to our two South Pacific populations, who gave significantly greater ratings of 
praiseworthiness. 
 In all, the results of Experiment 1 partially replicate the original side-effect effect noted 
by Knobe (2003a). We confirm the findings for both judgments of intentional action and ratings 
of blame and praise with participants in USA 1 and USA 2, as well as Mexico 1 and South 
Korea. We partially replicate the phenomenon with one of the variables (i.e., with intentional 
action or ratings of blame/praise, but not both) in Costa Rica, Mexico 2, and Honduras. The 
partial replication of the intentional action question may have resulted in part from our choice to 
measure this outcome dichotomously, which may have undercut our ability to fully detect an 
effect in these small samples. Finally, we observed a tendency toward an inversion of the side-
effect effect in both South Pacific samples, particularly in the significant within-subjects 
comparison of help and harm conditions. The within-subject analysis of participants attests to the 
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consistency of the original side-effect effect in Mexico 1 and Mexico 2, and demonstrates the 
robustness of the inverted effect in Samoa and Vanuatu. Finally, the correlation between  
intentional action and praise/blame ratings is markedly different across cultures.   
 
4. Experiment 2 
 To control for potential differences in the meaning and title of the protagonist in the 
vignette used in small-scale societies (e.g., Samoa, Vanuatu, and Costa Rica), we ran a second 
experiment with US participants using the same labeling (e.g., High Chief) to describe the 
authority figure in the story.  The rationale for this second experiment was that if participants 
were engaged in moral reasoning per se, the change in labeling of the authority figure from CEO 
to Chief should not affect the side-effect effect observed in the US participants of Experiment 1.  
Inversely, if differences in semantics drive the effect, we reasoned that the asymmetry between 
blame and praise conditions should either change or disappear. We expected the former. 
4.1 Method 
We tested an additional cohort of 56 American participants (see USA 3 in Table 1) with 
the English translation of the script used in these societies and that replaced CEO with High 
Chief (see Supplemental Materials).  In a within-subjects design, participants answered both the 
intentionality and blame/praise rating questions for both help and harm conditions in a 
counterbalanced order.     
4.2 Results 
 Following the analysis of Experiment 1, we initially considered only responses to the first 
vignette read by the participant (harm or help). With regard to the intention question, we 
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observed a significant effect of condition (Fisher’s exact test: p < .01).  Confirming the side-
effect effect, 82.1% of participants in the harm condition judged the actions of the high chief as 
intentional, whereas only 14.3% of participants judged the action as intentional in the help 
condition.  
 Regarding the Likert scale ratings of praise or blame, an independent samples t-test 
yielded a significant effect of condition (t(54) = 6.56, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.79).  Consistent 
with the side-effect effect, ratings were significantly higher in the harm condition (M=5.04, 
SD=1.07) than the help condition (M=2.61, SD=1.64).   
 We also analyzed the within-subject consistency of the side-effect effect. A significant 
majority of participants (N=40, or 71%) changed their judgment of intentional action between 
conditions (two-tailed binomial test: p =.002).  Of these participants, a significant majority 
(N=38/40, or 95%) demonstrated the side-effect effect by judging that the High Chief acted 
intentionally in the harm but not the help condition (two-tailed binomial test: p < .01). No order 
effects were noted. Regarding the Likert scale ratings of praise and blame, a mixed-design 
ANOVA factoring condition (2) as a repeated factor and condition order (2) as a between-
subjects factor yielded only a significant main effect of condition (F(1,54) = 49.10, p <.01 K2 = 
.476). Within-subjects, participants gave significantly higher ratings in the harm condition 
(M=4.77, SD=1.07) relative to the help condition (M=2.61, SD=1.71).   
 A final analysis demonstrates that the magnitude of the side-effect effect is comparable 
across the three samples of American participants. Considering only responses to the first 
vignette (help or harm), an independent chi-square test yielded no effect of cohort on judgments 
of intentional action. In the harm condition, the majority of participants in USA 1 (80.0%), USA 
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2 (91.7%) and USA 3 (82.1%) found the protagonist’s actions to be intentional, whereas in the 
help condition, participants in USA 1 (30%), USA 2 (23.1%), and USA 3 (14.3%) were equally 
unlikely to say the protagonist acted intentionally. Overall, collapsed across cohort, a significant 
majority (82.9%) of US participants judged the protagonist as acting intentionally in the harm 
condition, whereas only 22.5% of participants judged the act as intentional in the help condition 
(χ2 = 51.43, df = 1, p < .001, Crammer’s V = .604), proportions that mirror Knobe’s original 
findings. With regard to the ratings of blame and praise, and considering only responses to the 
first vignette, a univariate ANOVA factoring cohort (3) and condition (2) yielded only an effect 
of condition (F(1,135)=79.25, p <.01, K2 = .370).  Across cohorts, participants gave significantly 
higher ratings in the harm condition (M=4.85, SD=1.33) than in the help condition (M=2.30, 
SD=1.68).  These findings attest to the robustness of the side-effect effect, which appears to be 
equally strong across samples of U.S. participants who differ markedly in their demographic 
features, including age, race, and education level.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the side-effect 
effect is comparable amongst cohorts even when changing the labeling of the authority figure in 
the vignette.  Participants tended to provide similar ratings of blame and praise as well as 
judgments of intentional action whether the protagonist was depicted as a CEO or village High 
Chief.  
 Collectively, these results replicate what we found with a comparable sample of 
participants in Experiment 1. We thus confirm that semantic difference between CEO and high 
chief does not impact the moral reasoning of the participants.  Both scripts elicit the side-effect 
effect originally demonstrated by Knobe (2003a).   
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5. Experiment 3 
In another follow-up experiment, we examined two factors that could potentially drive 
the inversion of the side-effect effect noted in the South Pacific. As a working hypothesis, and to 
explore further the cross-cultural variability found in Experiment 1, we reasoned that because 
these two small-scale societies emphasize deference to authority and are characterized by highly 
visible and transparent delegations of power (O’Meara, 1990; Triandis & Gelfand, 1982), 
attributions of intentional action as well as blame and praise ratings would depend on the status 
of the protagonist. In particular, we anticipated that for these two cultures, attributions of 
intentional action, as well as ratings of praise and blame, should be higher in scenarios depicting 
the actions of a commoner versus a chief. The additional manipulation of gender was 
exploratory, probing any effect of the differential status of women in Vanuatu, where gender 
roles are more segregated (Rivers, 1914), compared to Samoa, where women are more active in 
the Samoan chief (matai) system of governance (Shore, 1982). 
5.1 Method 
Participants (N=61) were tested on both the original harm and help vignettes, as well as a 
second set of vignettes featuring protagonists varying in gender and status. Specifically, a subset 
of the Samoan (N=27) and Ni-Vanuatu (N=34) participants who read both vignettes (harm and 
help) about the chief in Experiment 1, also read two more help and harm vignettes involving a 
protagonist who was either a male or female commoner. Therefore, in this mixed-design, 
participants received in a counterbalanced order a set of two vignettes (help and harm) about the 
High Chief, plus a set of two vignettes (help and harm) about a commoner (i.e., an individual 
that was not a Chief) identified as either a man or a woman (see Supplemental Materials). For 
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our dependent measures, for each vignette participants made the same judgments of intentional 
action and ratings of blame or praise described previously.   
5.2 Results 
 In a first set of analyses, we assessed whether judgments of intentional action depended 
on the gender of the story protagonist. A chi-square test of independence compared the 
proportion of participants who judged the act to be intentional as a function of culture, condition 
(help and harm), and protagonist gender, yielding no significant results. Across culture and 
conditions, participants were at chance in judging whether a woman (62.6%) or a man (66.7%) 
acted intentionally.  The gender of the commoner did not appear to influence determinations of 
intentional action in either condition for either culture. 
 We also analyzed the Likert ratings of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness in a mixed-
design ANOVA including condition (help and harm) as a within-subjects factor and culture (2) 
and gender (2) of the story protagonist as between-subjects factors.  Results yielded only a 
marginal main effect of condition that is consistent with our previous findings (F(1,57) = 3.25, 
p=.077, K2 = .054).  Independent of culture and the gender of the story protagonist, participants 
tended to give higher praise ratings in the help condition (M=4.79, SD=2.00) than blame ratings 
in the harm condition (M=3.95, SD=2.48). Since we observed no effect of gender on either of 
our dependent measures, responses for the male and female vignettes are subsequently collapsed 
for all analyses reported below. 
Next we assessed whether participants judged intentional actions differently for a Chief 
versus a commoner (independent of gender).  A chi-square test of independence compared the 
proportion of participants who judged the act as intentional as a function of population, 
condition, and status.  Results yielded a significant joint influence of these three factors (F2 = 
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28.62, df=3, p<.01, Cramer’s V = .345).  In follow-up tests, for each culture we compared the 
proportion of participants who judged the actions as intentional as a function of condition and 
status. We observed that in both populations, in the harm condition participants were equally 
likely to attribute intentional action to the chief or the commoner.  However, in the help 
condition, significantly more participants in both Samoa and Vanuatu judged that the Chief acted 
intentionally (92.3% and 88.6%, respectively) compared to the commoner (42.3% and 55.9%, 
respectively; both p<.01 based on Fisher’s exact tests).  These results replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1, but only when the protagonist in the story is in a position of authority and 
leadership (i.e., a chief).   
 Finally, we examined the rating responses in a mixed-design ANOVA including 
condition (help and harm) and status (chief versus commoner) as within-subjects factors and 
population as a between-subjects factor. Results yielded a significant interaction of condition and 
status (F(1,55) = 3.51, p = .047, K2 = .060).  In follow-up tests, across cultures we found that in 
the harm condition (p = .008), participants gave significantly higher ratings to the commoner 
(M=5.08, SD=1.52) than the chief (M=3.84, SD=2.46), indicating that they found the actions of 
the commoner to be significantly more blameworthy.  In contrast, in the help condition, 
participants across culture gave significantly higher ratings to the chief (M =5.04, SD=1.81) than 
the commoner (M=4.81, SD=2.03), indicating that they found the actions of the chief to be 
significantly more praiseworthy (p=.034).  
 Consistent with our hypotheses, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that the inversion of 
the side-effect effect observed in the South Pacific may be driven by perceived status of the 
protagonist. We observed more judgments of intentional action and greater ratings of 
praiseworthiness in the help condition, but only when the protagonist was described as a chief.  
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In contrast, in the harm condition judgments of intentional action did not vary across protagonist 
status, although Likert ratings of blameworthiness were higher for commoners compared to the 
chief. In sum, the status (but not gender) of the protagonist appears to be a significant factor in 
both judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation in these two rural, traditional cultures. 
 
6. Experiment 4 
To ascertain further the role of perceived status as determinant of the side-effect effect, in 
a final experiment, we tested a new cohort of participants (USA 4) on both the harm and help 
vignettes, this time changing the protagonist’s label from CEO to co-worker. The aim was to 
reproduce in the USA with college students what we manipulated in both Samoa and Vanuatu 
comparing vignettes involving either a commoner or a High Chief. We expected that if status is 
indeed a determinant factor, we should find that describing the protagonist as co-worker instead 
of CEO in the USA should have a mitigated effect on the side effect-effect. In short, despite the 
reported cultural variations, we expected to find some influence of status in the USA regarding 
attribution of intent and ratings of either blame or praise. 
6.1 Method 
Participants (N=60, see Table 1) read a modified version of both the original harm and 
help vignettes, presented in a counterbalanced fashion across participants, in which the 
protagonist was described as a co-worker in the company, implying that they were not in a 
position of power. Gender neutral language was used to describe the characters in the vignette. 
For our dependent measures and for each vignette, participants made the same judgments of 
intentional action and ratings of blame or praise described previously. 
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6.2 Results 
 A Fisher’s exact test comparing the proportion of participants who judged the act to be 
intentional as a function of condition (help and harm) yielded significant results that confirm the 
original side effect-effect (p<.001). Overall, 15% of participants judged the co-worker’s action to 
be intentional in the help condition, compared to 53.3% in the harm condition. The same 
significant asymmetry was found in ratings of praise or blame based on an paired samples t-test 
(t(1,59)=7.09, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.85). On average, the magnitude of praise ratings (M = 2.28, 
SD = 1.57) tended to be significantly less than blame ratings (M = 4.32, SD = 1.55). Within 
subjects comparisons show that a significant majority of participants demonstrated such an 
asymmetry (93%, binomial test p<.001). We observed no effect of order on either of these 
trends. 
 To further examine status as a factor, in a second set of analyses, we compared these data 
with those obtained from the USA 2 cohort who were the most similar in terms of demographics 
and who, in a between-subjects design, received either the help or harm vignettes with a CEO 
rather than a co-worker as protagonist. In this analysis, to ensure greater comparability between 
cohorts, we considered only the first vignette USA 4 participants received (either blame or 
praise). Regarding attributions of intention, a Fisher’s exact test yielded a significant effect of 
protagonist status (CEO versus co-worker) for the harm (p = .017) but not the help condition. In 
the help condition, a minority of participants in both cohorts judged the actions of the protagonist 
as intentional, no matter their status (23.1% for USA 2 and 22.2% for USA 4, respectively). 
However, in the Harm condition, when the protagonist is portrayed as a CEO (USA 2 cohort), 
91.7% of participants judged the protagonist as acting intentionally. In contrast, when described 
as a co-worker (USA 4 cohort), 51.5% of the participants judged the action as intentional. 
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However, the effect of protagonist status did not extend to the ratings of blame and 
praiseworthiness. Results failed to yield a significant condition-by-status interaction, and only a 
main effect of condition (help versus harm) was noted (F(1,81)=20.37, p<.001, K2 = .201). 
Independent of status, participants gave significantly higher ratings in harm (M = 4.51, SD = 
1.63) than in praise (M = 2.47, SD = 2.06) conditions.  Therefore, the effect of status is not 
evident in relation to ratings of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.  
 Overall, the results of Experiment 4 show that amongst US participants, changing the 
status of the protagonist tends to mitigate the side-effect effect, although not cancelling it. As 
hypothesized, we found that significantly more participants tended to attribute intentionality to 
harm the environment when the protagonist is described as CEO as opposed to co-worker, here 
construed as having less power status in enacting decisions within the portrayed institution.  
 
7. Discussion  
In small-scale, collectivist, and “face-to-face” societies (Fiske et al., 1998; Greenfield et 
al., 2003), high-ranking status arguably carries different meanings compared to the high-ranking 
status of CEOs in urban industrial and more individualistic (W.E.I.R.D.) societies. Blaming a 
high chief has different consequences in the former, as determinations of blame often carry with 
them the implicit consequence of punishment or correction. As noted by Hofstede, Hofstede, & 
Minkov (2010), individuals of societies like Samoa and Vanuatu that are highly allocentric and 
collectivistic have significantly less autonomy in enacting authoritative decisions (e.g., punishing 
a transgressor), an action that is more typically the prerogative of high ranking Chiefs. This 
could explain our findings of an inversion of the side-effect effect in Samoa and Vanuatu, 
whereby individuals tend to see more intentional action in the help condition and provide higher 
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ratings of praiseworthiness. The fact that such an inversion does not extend to vignettes in which 
the protagonist is a commoner provides additional direct support to this interpretation.  
Noteworthy and further validating these findings is the fact that in a previous field trip 
research at these remote locations a few years prior, we tested over a hundred participants on the 
Knobe script with a high chief as protagonist and found the same inverted tendency toward 
higher ratings of praise. We could not include this previous body of observations in the present 
analysis as we accidently omitted asking the intentional action judgment question. Based on the 
collected praise/blame ratings, this original testing confirms what is presented here, likely to be a 
real phenomenon and not an experimental fluke. Furthermore, it is also doubtful that the reported 
cross-cultural variability is due to semantic differences considering that Samoan and Ni-Vanuatu 
languages are profoundly different. If it were just a semantic by-product in these small-scale 
societies, the difference found with commoners in both would be unlikely. Finally, a differential 
understanding of harm to the environment across culture cannot account for our results since we 
do not observe an inversion of the side-effect effect in the two Mexican cohorts or Costa Rican 
sample that all depend on natural resources and agriculture for their survival (Eakin et al., 2014; 
Jurjonas et al., 2016; Moguel & Toledo, 1999; Cusack & Dixon, 2006).  
The results of Experiment 2 further dismiss the possibility that semantic differences in 
the labeling of the authority figure drive the cultural variations of the side-effect effect observed 
here. The reported findings thus are likely linked to cultural differences in reasoning about 
intentional action and not to experimental or semantic artifacts. However, in relation to our 
interpretation, there is one caveat in the fact that in Costa Rica, where participants were also 
from a small-scale chief system society, we did not find the inversion of the phenomenon 
observed in both Vanuatu and Samoa. In addition to the small sample size at this locale, one 
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should note that in Costa Rica, there is considerable influence and economic aid coming from a 
stable and highly Westernized central government in the form of agroforestry, commercial food 
production, schooling, medical aid, and ecotourism (Dahlquist et al., 2007; Polidoro et al., 2008; 
Cusack & Dixon, 2006), all of which directly impact how the Bribri population manages their 
land as part of assigned indigenous reservations. In contrast, although subsistence crops are also 
linked to the well-being, livelihood, and cash economy of many regions in the South Pacific 
(O’Meara, 1990; Shore, 1982), much of the economic aid to Samoa and Vanuatu comes in the 
form of remittance inflows and foreign aid targeted toward infrastructure development (Allen, 
2000; Jayaraman & Ward, 2006; Kumar, Naidu, & Kumar, 2011; McGregor et al., 2009).  
The cultural variations in the side-effect effect reported here are also reinforced by the 
fact that evidence of such variations are based on both between and a within-subject comparisons 
for the subset of participants in Samoa, Vanuatu, Mexico 1, and Mexico 2 (Experiment 1), as 
well as USA 3 (Experiment 2). A similar mixed-design was used by Nichols & Ulatowski (2007) 
to assess the robustness of the side-effect effect, with data demonstrating that the asymmetry 
between greater ratings and judgments of intentionality for blame versus praise holds within 
individual participants. Here, however, we confirmed that the inversion of this side-effect effect 
in Samoa and Vanuatu exists in both the between and within subject comparison. Once again, 
this testifies to the robustness of our reported findings. 
Finally, we found further support that perceived status of the protagonist can mitigate the 
side-effect effect across all the tested populations. Experiment 2 and 4 yield some evidence of 
differential attribution of intentionality depending on the status of the protagonist (High Chief 
and CEO versus commoner and co-worker). Consistent with recent findings that religious beliefs 
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attenuate the side-effect effect (Clark et al., 2017), our data suggest that cultural differences in 
motivation to blame or praise may influence judgments of intentional action. 
However, although status seems to play an important role in participants’ judgments of 
intentionality, it is not clear what status might mean across such highly contrasted cultures (USA 
versus Samoa and Vanuatu). Future research is needed to specify the extent to which participants 
across cultures share the same stereotypes regarding status of authority and leadership within 
their group. In particular, it is possible that the inversion of the side-effect effect reported here 
might primarily rest on stereotypes of authority and leadership in decision making that are 
unique to those small scale traditional Melanesian and Polynesian cultures. For example, in 
Vanuatu and Samoa there are particularly elaborated rituals of gifting and systems of reciprocity  
through which individuals may accrue influence, prestige, and transcendence (O’Meara, 1990; 
Shore, 1982; Vienne, 1984).  It is indeed possible that in those cultures what participants are 
primarily basing their judgments on is a different perception of power rather than a fundamental 
difference in construing the relation between intentional action and moral evaluation, as it is 
often presumed in the side-effect effect. Likewise, the mitigating effect of status found with the 
US sample of Experiment 4 could also rest on the stereotype of CEOs harboring anti-
environmental attitudes (see for example Sripada & Konrath, 2011; Sripada, 2012). In addition, 
chieftain systems of governance in the South Pacific are based on traditions that are strongly 
cohesive and multigenerational. There may therefore be a degree of shared understanding and 
consensus about leadership in these societies that is qualitatively different than the Western 
context of  high market integration and large corporations with broader distribution of leadership 
making it harder to delineate authority relationships. 
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Inversions of the side-effect effect have been previously linked to contextual factors such 
as the explicitness of the moral norms that are violated in the vignette (Robinson, Stey, & 
Alfano, 2015), or  whether the participant is an agent or observer of the unintended consequence 
(Feltz, Harris, & Perez, 2012). Based on our data, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 
participants in the South Pacific may have aligned themselves with the story protagonist, and 
whether thinking of themselves as beneficiaries of the protagonist’s action might have made 
them more inclined to attribute intention to the chief’s action in the help condition. However, if 
something about living in small-scale, collective, traditional, and/or rural societies lent itself to 
such projective perspective-taking or immersive thinking, we might also expect to observe 
similar effects in the Costa Rican or even Mexican populations, which is not the case. Further 
research could help disambiguate these possibilities.  Finally, we do not believe that potential 
cultural differences in understanding of intentional action can fully explain our results. The 
classic side-effect effect is observed across a wide array of theory of mind concepts, including 
several variants of intent and belief  (McCann, 2005; Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Guglielmo & 
Malle, 2010). To our knowledge, none of these articulations of desire or belief states evoke the 
inversion of the side-effect effect noted here. In summary, although our results do not account 
directly for the mechanisms linking intentional attribution and moral judgments of praise or 
blame, they show that factoring status can help dissociate these two dimensions and thus could 
help in figuring out those mechanisms in future research. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Using the original Knobe paradigm, we find an inversion of the side-effect effect in two 
small-scale, traditional societies of the South Pacific. Our findings suggest that the widely 
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documented asymmetry between judgments of intentional action and moral evaluations is not 
necessarily unidirectional. Cultural beliefs about moral actions may influence how people 
perceive unintentional consequences, with both praise and blame influencing judgments of 
intentional action (Clark et al., 2017).  
Our results raise a number of interesting questions. If the relationship between moral 
evaluation and judgments of intentional action can be multi-directional, as our findings suggest, 
how can we predict what circumstances will increase or decrease blame attributions? Alicke et 
al. (2008) point to a “culpable control” model in which participants evaluate causal information 
alongside the favorability of the outcome or actors. Assignations of blame may be made when an 
agent is perceived as controlling a negative outcome (as in the harm condition), but also if 
evidential information suggests that an actor is dislikeable or is shown to be negligent (as might 
be the perception following the protagonist’s casual disregard for the environment). On the other 
hand, if the information about the actors or consequences is positive enough, it may even 
override contradictory evidence (e.g., a thriving economy or environment may be enough to 
deemphasize the cavalier attitude of the protagonist). Culture may influence judgments of 
intentional action not only by defining what acts are considered helpful versus harmful, but also 
perhaps by setting the threshold for how negative outcomes or agents must be before they are 
considered blameworthy (Alicke et al., 2008). Our findings may also call to question the 
assumption that transculturally, punitive measures carry higher instrumental value than reward 
(Henrich et al., 2006). That some cultures differentially emphasize praise over punishment may 
be consistent with an emerging literature demonstrating cultural variation in the tendency to 
engage in punitive versus restorative justice following violation of a fairness norm (Robbins & 
Rochat, 2011). Understanding the relationship between moral evaluation and judgment of 
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intentional action may have wide-reaching implications for how we understand and reform our 
criminal justice systems. 
In sum, we interpret our data to suggest that although the tendency to engage in moral 
evaluations is ubiquitous—we all engage in judgments about other people—rationalization for 
these judgments is likely context specific. More research is needed to specify further what 
cultural factors influence such evaluations. The cultural differences noted here point to the 
central importance of taking context seriously when theorizing about moral reasoning. 
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